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ABSTRACT
The accountability gap for conduct of International Organisations
(IOs) conflicting with their members’ human rights treaty
obligations undermines the acceptance of IOs as a forum of
international cooperation and weakens the achievements of the
UN Covenants alike. This article examines three possible
approaches to establish a legal link between IOs and their
members’ human rights treaty obligations. First, the treaty
obligations could be transferred to IOs through the act of
establishment. Second, IOs could be bound by the law of treaties
to interpret their founding treaty in accordance with their
members’ human rights treaty obligations. Third, obligations of
international cooperation could bind IOs to observe their members’
human rights treaty obligations. All approaches face the challenge
of paying deference to the independent legal personality of IOs as
well as the pacta tertiis problem. The article demonstrates that IOs
are bound to respect the UN Covenants to the extent their
obligations are generally accepted. For determining and further
developing substantive human rights obligations of relevance for
IOs, the UN Covenants’ Committees play a vital role.
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1. Introduction
The proliferation of International Organisations (IOs) in all areas of intergovernmental
cooperation has entailed numerous conflicts with international human rights law.
For instance, United Nations (UN) sanctions severely affect the human rights
guarantees of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),1
particularly article 12 on free movement and article 14 on the right to judicial
review.2 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has also been criticised for limiting
the WTO members’ policy space to implement their human rights obligations:3
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1International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171.
2e.g. Human Rights Committee (HRC), Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v Belgium, Communication No 1472/2006, Views (29
December 2008) CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006; August Reinisch, ‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Account-
ability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions’ (2001) 95 AJIL 851; Bardo Fassbender, ‘Targeted
Sanctions Imposed by the UN Security Council and Due Process Rights’ (2006) 3 IOLR 437.
3UN ECOSOC, ‘The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Globalization and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of
Human Rights’ Preliminary Report submitted by J. Oloka Onyango and Deepika Udagama, in accordance with Sub-
NORDIC JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 2018
VOL. 36, NO. 1, 74–90
https://doi.org/10.1080/18918131.2018.1453586
US – Clove Cigarettes4 and Australia – Tobacco Products5 show that the members’ leeway
to adopt anti-smoking policies required by the right to health guaranteed in article 12 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)6 is
severely impeded by WTO rules. Further cases of conflicts between IO conduct and the
UN Covenants are legion.7 However, holding IOs responsible for such conduct proves
difficult.
Establishing responsibility for conduct of IOs in conflict with the UN Covenants reveals
the infamous ‘accountability gap’:8 under international law, ‘ … international responsibility
arises from an internationally wrongful act’,9 which consists of an attributable conduct and
a breach of international obligations.10 Applying the rules of responsibility to IO conduct
in breach of the UN Covenants shows that neither IOs nor their members can be held
responsible. For instance, a UN Security Council resolution listing individuals on its sanctions
list but not providing for judicial review is attributable to the UN, but the UN is not in breach
of the ICCPR as it is not a party to the ICCPR. Holding UN members responsible for the
resolution fails as it is not attributable to the UN members but to the UN. Consequently,
there is no responsibility for IO conduct in breach of the UN Covenants.
Other approaches to establish responsibility do not fully solve the problem. Holding
IOs responsible for conduct in breach of their human rights obligations under custom-
ary international law is insufficient as the customary rules are uncertain and frequently
fall short of the obligations under the Covenants.11 Therefore, IO conduct may be in
conformity with the IO’s obligations but still conflict with its members’ human rights
treaty obligations. Alternatively, IO members could be held responsible for their
conduct in IOs12 or for their national acts of implementing IO obligations. Both
options, however, do not permit establishing responsibility for the act of the IO
causing the human rights problem.
This accountability gap severely undermines the achievements of the UN Covenants.
As IOs are not parties to the Covenants, neither their substantive standards nor their
Commission resolution 1999/8 (15 June 2000) E/CN4/Sub2/2000/13; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Human Rights and Inter-
national Economic Law in the 21st Century’ (2001) 4 JIEL 3.
4WTO Appellate Body Report on ‘United States: Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes’, WT/DS406,
adopted 24 April 2012.
5WTO Consultations on ‘Australia: Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain
Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging’, WT/DS434/and others, pending.
6International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966) 993 UNTS 3; for obligations relating to
the reduction of tobacco consumption see ICESCR General Comment No 14: Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of
Health (art 12 of the Covenant) (11 August 2000) E/C12/2000/4, paras 15, 51.
7e.g. Willem Van Genugten, Paul Hunt and Susan Mathews (eds), World Bank, IMF, and Human Rights (Wolf Legal 2003); Jan
Wouters and others (eds), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia 2010)
215ff.
8James Crawford, ‘Holding International Organisations and Their Members to Account’, Fifth Steinkraus-Cohen International
Law Lecture (15 March 2007) Part I <www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/crawford_lecture.pdf> accessed 24 August 2017.
9art 1 ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR) (12 December 2001) A/RES/56/83,
Annex; art 3 ILC, Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) (9 December 2011) A/RES/66/100,
Annex; ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment (Merits) (26 February 2007) 2007 ICJ Reports 43, para
385; ICJ, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion (29 April 1999) 1999 ICJ Reports 62, para 66.
10ASR (n 9) art 2; ARIO (n 9) art 4.
11e.g. Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection (OUP 2009) 68ff.
12e.g. ICESCR General Comment (GC) No 15: Right to Water (arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) (20 January 2003) E/CN12/
2002/11, para 36 suggests an obligation of IO members to ensure that IOs do not act in a manner that prevents their
members from fulfilling their human rights obligations.
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monitoring mechanisms apply to IOs.13 This problem is of growing concern as states
increasingly use IOs as vehicles for creating and implementing international legal
regimes to the extent that, today, there is hardly any national policy area not governed
by rules adopted in the framework of IOs. Accordingly, exploring legal approaches to
bind IOs to observe the UN Covenants is of utmost importance as this legal gap not
only weakens the effectiveness of the UN human rights system, but also the acceptance
of IOs as a forum of inter-state cooperation.
This article examines approaches to overcoming the legal gap between IOs and their
members’ human rights treaty obligations. Part 2 explains the international law rules that
prevent IOs from being automatically bound by their members’ human rights treaty obli-
gations. Parts 3 to 5 analyse three possible approaches to overcome the legal gap: the transfer
of obligations under the Covenants from IO members to IOs through the members’ acts of
accession (Part 3); the obligation of IOs under international treaty law to interpret their
founding instruments in the light of their members’ treaty obligations (Part 4); and the obli-
gation of IOs to take into account their members’ treaty obligations as part of the obligation
of international cooperation (Part 5). The various approaches are discussed using examples
of the UN and the WTO, but the theoretical considerations on the relationship between IOs
and their members’ human rights treaty obligations will be generally relevant for IOs. The
legal debate on the European Union (EU) and its members’ obligations under the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides useful guidance,14 although the differences
between the EU as a highly integrated system and general IOs, with limited functions and
powers, must be kept in mind. The conclusion examines to what extent these approaches
permit the overcoming of the legal gap and identifies appropriate steps to strengthen the
impact of the UN Covenants on the conduct of IOs.
2. IOs and their Members’ Human Rights Treaty Obligations under General
International Law
Why are IOs not bound by the treaty obligations of their members as their founders?
Under international law, IOs are subjects of international law, albeit with functionally
limited powers.15 As subjects of international law, they have their own rights and duties
under international law that are entirely independent from those of their members.16
Any deviation from that principle would diminish the effectiveness of IOs. As the
treaty obligations of IO members vary widely, the interests of IO members to fulfil their
different treaty obligations would impede the independent action of IOs that is necessary
to fulfil their purposes and effectively perform their functions. For that reason, the rights
and obligations of IOs and their members must strictly be distinguished.
13See practice of the HRC at <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx> and practice of the Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) at <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/pages/cescrindex.aspx> both
accessed 24 August 2017.
14Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950, ETS No 5) as amended by
the Protocols No 11 (11 May 1994, ETS No 155), and No 14 (27 May 2009, ETS No 194); Paul Gragl, The Accession of the
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2013) 3ff, 50ff.
15ICJ, ‘Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations’, Advisory Opinion (11 April 1949) 1949 ICJ
Reports 174, 178ff; Fassbender (n 2) 459ff (para 3.5); Henry Schermers and Niels Blokker, International Institutional
Law (5th edn, Martinus Nijhoff 2011) ss 1566.
16ICJ, ‘Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt’, Advisory Opinion (20 December
1980) 1980 ICJ Reports 73, para 37.
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International treaty law confirms that IOs, as subjects of international law, are not auto-
matically bound by treaty obligations of their members: treaties only bind subjects of inter-
national law that have consented to be bound by a treaty.17 This consent requirement
originates in the sovereign equality of states as subjects of international law, an attribute
of which is the right to decide about one’s own treaty obligations.18 A corollary of the
consent requirement is the pacta tertiis rule which establishes that treaties do not create
rights or obligations for third parties without their consent.19 Following this rule, the
members’ human rights treaty obligations constitute pacta tertiis, and do not create
rights or obligations for an IO as a ‘third party’.20
To develop legal avenues to bind IOs to observe the UN Covenants, possible legal
sources are the general rules of international law, the founding treaties of IOs or inter-
national agreements to which they are parties.21 As IOs typically are not parties to
human rights treaties22 and their founding treaties are usually silent on the applicability
of IO members’ treaty obligations to IOs, let alone do they bind IOs to observe their
members’ human rights treaty obligations,23 it must be examined whether general inter-
national law contains rules to overcome the legal gap between IOs and their members’
human rights treaty obligations. A feasible theory must sufficiently take into account
the independent legal personality of IOs as well as the pacta tertiis rule.
3. Transfer of Treaty Obligations to IOs through the Members’ Acts of
Accession
A legal approach to bind IOs to observe their members’ human rights treaty obligations is
the transfer of these obligations to IOs with the act of accession.24 Following this approach,
a member’s consent to join an IO includes the transfer of its human rights treaty obli-
gations to the IO. As a consequence, the IO replaces its members in fulfilling their
human rights obligations. For example, if the UN adopted restrictive measures against
individuals, it must observe the fair trial obligations under article 14 of the ICCPR
instead of its members. Similarly, if the WTO dispute settlement institutions decided
17art 2(1)(b) and art 11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT); art 2(1)(b) and art
11 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations (21 March 1986) A/CONF129/15 (VCLTIO).
18e.g. PCIJ, SS Wimbledon (UK v Japan) (17 August 1923) 1923 PCIJ (Ser A) No 1, para 35; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Prin-
ciples of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 115f, 179f.
19VCLT (n 17) art 34, VCLTIO (n 17) art 34; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law: Volume I
Peace (Longman 1992) 1260ff; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Parties and the Law of Treaties’ (2002) 6 MPYUNL 37.
20Cornelia Janik, Die Bindung internationaler Organisationen an internationale Menschenrechtsstandards [English: The Com-
mitment of International Organisations to International Human Rights Standards] (Mohr Siebeck 2012) 412.
21ICJ, ‘Interpretation of the Agreement’ (n 16) para 37; Schermers and Blokker (n15) ss 1145, ss 1335 and ss 1572.
22An exception is the EU who is a party to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (13 December 2006)
2515 UNTS 3.
23An exception is, again, the EU: cf text below accompanying n 99ff.
24e.g. Moshe Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles (Martinus
Nijhoff 1995) 38ff; Pierre Klein, La responsabilité des organisations internationales dans les ordres juridiques internes et en
droit des gens (Bruylant 1998) 331ff; Tawhida Ahmed and Butler De Jesús, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: An
International Perspective’ (2006) 17 EJIL 771, 788ff; Olivier De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of International
Organisations: The Logic of Sliding Scales in the Law of International Responsibility’ in Jan Wouters and others (eds),
Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia 2010) 51, 57ff; Frederik Naert,
‘Binding International Organisations to Member State Treaties or Responsibility of Member States for Their Own
Actions in the Framework of International Organisations’ in Jan Wouters and others (eds), Accountability for Human
Rights Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia 2010) 129, 132ff; Janik (n 20) 404ff.
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on national measures of tobacco control, they must observe the obligations of the right to
health under article 12 of the ICESCR instead of its members. The assumption common to
the various theories proposed25 is that the members’ accession to IOs automatically creates
legal obligations of IOs towards third parties to observe their members’ treaty obligations
instead of their members, thus bypassing the IOs’ right to consent.26
Following the theory of succession, IOs are the ‘successors’ of their members and, as
such, succeed into their human rights treaty obligations. This approach applies the
general international rules of state succession by analogy. Based on the principle of con-
tinuity of legal obligations, the obligations of states are transferred to IOs and continue to
apply.27 However, the theory poses numerous problems.
First, the status of the rules on state succession in treaties as rules of general inter-
national law is unclear.28 The 1978 Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Trea-
ties (CSST)29 entered into force only in 1996, and the current 22 ratifications30 suggest that
the general acceptance necessary to form customary international law does not exist.31 The
practice of state succession supports that conclusion as the various cases of state succession
do not show a uniform pattern but vary depending on the political circumstances.32
Second, the analogous application of the rules on state succession to IOs is problematic
as state succession fundamentally differs from the establishment of an IO. Following
article 2(1)(b) CSST, ‘state succession’ means the ‘ … replacement of one state by
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory’, indicating that
the first state ceases to exist and is replaced by the second one who takes over all respon-
sibilities. IOs, however, do not replace their members, but exist in addition to their
members who continue to exist. Moreover, IOs only possesses a legal personality with
functionally limited powers which excludes the full succession in the ‘ … responsibility
for the international relations of territory’ or the full implementation of all human
rights treaty obligations.33
Third, the rules of state succession cannot explain an ‘automatic’ succession of IOs into
their members’ treaty obligations. Although continuity of treaty obligations is common in
cases of state succession, treaties always apply to the successor state only after agreement
with the other contracting parties.34 Whether such agreement is necessary in case of
human rights treaties has been subject to debate.35 The Human Rights Committee
(HRC) suggests that human rights treaties automatically continue to apply,36 which is
supported by some practice.37 However, the necessary consistent practice as well as
25cf references in n 24.
26cf text accompanying n 17ff.
27De Schutter (n 24) 57ff; Naert (n 24) 132ff; Janik (n 20) 404ff.
28Akbar Rasulov, ‘Revisiting State Succession to Humanitarian Treaties: Is There a Case for Automaticity?’ (2003) 14 EJIL 141,
147ff.
29Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (23 August 1978) 1946 UNTS 3.
30See <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXIII-2&chapter=23&clang=_en> accessed 24
August 2017.
31Menno Kamminga, ‘Impact on State Succession in Respect of Treaties’ in Menno Kamminga and Martin Scheinin (eds), The
Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (OUP 2009) 99, 99; Naert (n 24) 133; Anthony Aust, Modern
Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn, CUP 2013) 321f.
32Jennings and Watts (n 19) 209ff; Rasulov (n 28) 141ff.
33On the scope of human rights implementing obligations see text below accompanying n 123ff.
34Rasulov (n 28) 150; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 18) 438ff; Aust (n 31) 322ff.
35Rasulov (n 28) 143; Kamminga (n 31) 100ff.
36e.g. HRC General Comment No 26: Continuity of Obligations (8 December 1997) CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add8/Rev1, para 4.
37Kamminga (n 31) 102ff.
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opinio iuris to make the automatic succession in international human rights treaties a rule
of general international law does not exist.38
An alternative approach to explain the transfer of the members’ human rights treaty
obligations to IOs is the theory of functional substitution: accordingly the IOs’ obligations
to observe their members’ treaty obligations derive from the powers transferred to the
organisation.39 Based on the principle ‘nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse
habet’,40 states can only transfer to IOs powers with their relevant international law obli-
gations attached, and acts of IOs violating these obligations would exceed the IOs’
powers.41 Following this theory, IOs do not succeed in all obligations of their members,
but only in the obligations relevant for the exercise of the IOs’ powers.
The only example of a functional substitution so far is the European Community’s
(EC’s) de facto membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).42
The conditions for that substitution were very strict: all EC members were also GATT
Contracting Parties and had transferred to the EC exclusive powers to act in the field of
external trade, meaning no powers to act remained with the members. But although the
members’ treaty obligations were uniform and the EC had all necessary powers to
implement them, the transfer of obligations was not ‘automatic’, but all relevant actors,
namely all EC members, the EC, and all other GATT Contracting Parties expressly con-
sented to the substitution.43 As a result, the independence of the EC and its right to
consent were respected. Whether these tight conditions can be met by other IOs is,
however, doubtful.
First, it is difficult to determine what powers constitute the basis for attaching inter-
national law obligations. The powers of IOs are not only fundamentally different from
those of states, but also extremely limited. The only exception is the EU which holds com-
prehensive legislative and judicial powers to act with binding legal effect for states and
individuals. This makes the EU’s powers comparable to those of states and permits iden-
tifying the relevant treaty obligations of EUmembers attached to the powers transferred to
the EU. To ensure that the EU has the capacity to fulfil all obligations arising under such
treaties, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) accepts a substitution only if
the EU holds the relevant exclusive powers to act.44 In contrast, the powers of other IOs
usually do not correspond to those of states but are fairly limited and complement rather
38Rasulov (n 28) 159ff; Kamminga (n 31) 107ff; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 18) 440.
39Christoph Schreuer, ‘Die Bindung Internationaler Organisationen an völkerrechtliche Verträge ihrer Mitgliedstaaten’ in
Konrad Ginther and Gerhard Hafner (eds), Völkerrecht zwischen normativem Anspruch und politischer Realität: Festschrift
für Karl Zemanek zum 65. Geburtstag (Duncker & Humblot 1995) 223, 237; De Schutter (n 24) 62; Naert (n 24) 133ff; Janik
(n 20) 410ff.
40Arbitral Award (Arbitrator Max Huber), Island of Palmas Case (4 April 1928) 1928 RIAA 829, 842; ICJ, ‘Legal Consequences
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970)’, Advisory Opinion (21 June 1971) 1971 ICJ Reports 16, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitz-
maurice, para 65; Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht: Theorie und Praxis (3rd edn, Duncker &
Humblot 1984) s 991.
41ICJ, ‘Legal Consequences for States’ (n 40), Dissenting Opinion Fitzmaurice paras 65ff; Henry Schermers, ‘The European
Communities Bound by Fundamental Rights’ (1990) 27 CMLR 249, 251ff; De Schutter (n 24) 62ff and and references there
at n 27.
42General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) (30 October 1947) 55 UNTS 194; for details Schreuer (n 39) 227ff;
Naert (n 24) 136ff.
43ECJ, Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219, paras
10ff; Hirsch (n 24) 39ff; Naert (n 24) 132; Janik (n 20) 406.
44e.g. ECJ International Fruit (n 43) paras 14ff; CJEU, Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America v Secretary of State
for Energy and Climate Change [2011] ECR I-13755, para 63.
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than substitute the powers of their members. For instance, the WTO holds powers to
administer trade negotiations or to settle trade disputes between WTO members but
the powers to regulate trade and implement WTO obligations remain entirely with the
WTO members. Accordingly, it is difficult to identify transferred powers to which the
members’ treaty obligations are attached.45
Second, it is unclear how this theory permits considering differences in the members’
treaty obligations. The human rights treaty obligations of IO members are usually not
uniform. In fact, none of the UN Covenants is ratified by all UN members or by all
WTO members. If an automatic transfer of treaty obligations was accepted, it would be
only logical that all functionally relevant international treaty obligations of all members
were transferred to IOs.46 As such transfer may alter the obligations arising from IO mem-
bership in the light of these treaties, it would cause a pacta tertiis problem:47 all members
who have not accepted a transferred treaty are third parties and may reject its application.
Moreover, if such rule existed, it would implicate that becoming member of an IO entailed
an indirect acceptance of treaties concluded by other members which may even deter
states from joining IOs.
Third, the theory of functional substitution cannot explain an automatic transfer of
treaty obligations: to be bound by a treaty always requires consent.48 Klein doubts that
the consent requirement applies to IOs, as their legal personality is not necessarily iden-
tical with that of states, following Reparation for Injuries;49 according to Klein, one differ-
ence compared to states is that IOs derive their powers from their members; therefore,
there is no need to consent to be bound by the treaty obligations of their members.50
However, his position must be rebutted. Although IOs may have different rights and obli-
gations than states, this does not imply that they are bound by international agreements
without their consent. The VCLTIO expressly provides for consent if IOs conclude trea-
ties;51 moreover, the EC’s functional substitution into the GATT confirms the consent
requirement.52 Waiving the consent requirement would deprive an IO of an essential
element of its independent legal personality, namely the capacity to freely decide about
entering into treaty commitments.53
To sum up, the various theories to establish that an IO is automatically bound by the
human rights treaty obligations of its members through its members’ acts of accession are
not convincing. Ignoring the IO’s right to consent to its treaty obligations shatters the
basic concepts of international treaty law. However, obtaining consent of all relevant
actors is unlikely. Many IOs, including the UN and the WTO, are reluctant to expressly
accept human rights obligations,54 and IO members who are not parties to the Covenants
will hardly consent to such transfer. For instance, the US is not party to the ICESCR and
45Naert (n 24) 134.
46De Schutter (n 24) 64.
47See, in contrast, text below accompanying n 74ff.
48See text above accompanying n 17.
49See n 15 above.
50Klein (n 24) 346ff.
51See n 17 above.
52See text above accompanying n 42f.
53See n 18 above.
54For UN practice: Schermers and Blokker (n 15) s 1577; for the WTO: WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration (13 December
1996) WT/MIN(96)/DEC, para 4, where the WTO accepts the observance of ‘internationally recognised core labour stan-
dards’ but merely pledges cooperation with the International Labour Organisation.
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hardly would agree that theWTO is bound by that treaty, as such consent would imply the
application of WTO rules in the light of the ICESCR and incidentally the US’s indirect
acceptance of the ICESCR. Moreover, an automatic application of treaties of its
members would undermine the independent legal personality of an IO as well as the effec-
tiveness of its work as it would require an IO not only to observe the large number of
human rights treaty obligations of all its members, but, more generally, all existing
treaty obligations of all its members.55
4. Obligations under the Rules of Treaty Interpretation
As IOs are not directly bound by their members’ human rights treaty obligations, the rules
of international treaty law may provide an alternative: they may require IOs to interpret
their founding treaties and subsequent IO secondary law in the light of their members’
human rights treaty obligations and, accordingly, bind IOs indirectly to observe the UN
Covenants. This approach has been discussed controversially in the WTO and human
rights debate which provides useful guidance for examining whether such obligation
exists generally for IOs.56 As the rules on treaty interpretation codified in articles 31–32
of the VCLT constitute customary international law, they are binding for IOs.57 Conse-
quently, this approach respects the independent legal personality of IOs and could
avoid the pacta tertiis problem.
Founding treaties of IOs constitute treaties between states to which the rules of inter-
national treaty law apply.58 Therefore, IOs must interpret their statutes following these
rules.59 Article 31(1) of the VCLT requires interpreting treaties in good faith.60 Treaty
terms must be given their ordinary meaning in the light of the object and purpose of
the treaty and in the light of its context.61 Following article 31(3)(c), the ‘ … relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ form part of
that context. The rules may stem from all sources of international law62 and include all
treaties applicable at the time of interpretation.63 Article 31(3)(c) also expresses the prin-
ciple of harmonious interpretation: it is based on the presumption against normative
55De Schutter (n 24) 64; Janik (n 20) 409.
56e.g. Lorand Bartels, ‘Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’ (2001) 35 JWT 499; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The
Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’ (2001) 95 AJIL 535; Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO
Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’ (2002) 13 EJIL 753.
57e.g. ICJ, Case Concerning Application of the Convention (n 9) para 160; ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (13 April 2006) A/CN4/L682, para 427; Oliver Dörr,
‘Article 31’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer 2012) 521,
para 6.
58VCLT, art 5.
59Dörr (n 57) para 18; Aust (n 31) 343ff; for the WTO: art 3.2 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (15 April 1994) 1869
UNTS 401.
60Dörr (n5 7) paras 60f; for good faith as a general principle of law: Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as applied by Inter-
national Courts and Tribunals (Stevens & Sons 1953) 106ff.
61VCLT art 31(2) and (3); WTO Appellate Body Report on ‘European Communities: Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless
Chicken Cuts’, WT/DS269/WT/DS286, adopted 27 September 2005, paras 170ff; Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press 1984) 119ff; Jennings and Watts (n 19) 1271ff; Mark Villiger, Commentary on
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) art 31.
62WTO Panel Report on ‘European Communities: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products’, WT/
DS291/and others, adopted 21 November 2006, para 7.67; Sinclair (n 61) 119; Gabrielle Marceau, ‘A Call for Coherence in
International Law: Praises for the Prohibition Against “Clinical Isolation” in WTO Dispute Settlement’ (1999) 33 JWT 87,
123; Pauwelyn, (n 56) 575; ILC, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 57) para 426; Dörr (n 57) paras 93ff.
63ICJ, ‘Legal Consequences for States’ (n 40) para 53; Pauwelyn (n 56) 574f; Villiger (n 61), art 31, para 25.
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conflict and requires to interpret treaties in harmony with the entire system of inter-
national law.64
To qualify as a source of interpretation under article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, the UN
Covenants must fulfil two conditions both of which reflect the principle of harmonious
interpretation. First, the UN Covenants must be ‘relevant’. This term allows for broad
interpretation. The Covenants will generally be relevant if they are ‘ … applicable to the
facts of the case at hand’65 and if they concern the subject matter of the treaty term at
issue.66 This must be determined on a case-by-case basis examining the subject and
content of the case.67 For instance, if the WTO decides on the legality of measures to
prevent smoking, article 12 of the ICESCR on the right to health is relevant.68
Second, the UN Covenants must be ‘ … applicable in the relations between the
parties’. The meaning of this phrase is controversial.69 A narrow interpretation that
requires all IO members to be parties to the UN Covenants has been criticised as disre-
garding the principle of effective interpretation: it renders article 31(3)(c) largely
irrelevant by excluding not only the UN Covenants, but essentially all treaties as
context for interpretation because it is very unlikely that all members of a universal
IO are parties to the same treaty.70 Another interpretation suggests that ‘parties’ only
means the parties to the dispute. Thereafter, the UN Covenants can be considered as
context only if the IO members that are parties to the dispute have accepted them. A
refutation of this option is that it produces diverging interpretations of the IO founding
treaties and subsequent secondary law depending on the parties to the dispute, which
may result in inter-se modifications of IO law.71 The interpretation favoured by most
authors emphasises the object and purpose of article 31(3)(c), namely to facilitate the
interpretation of treaties in harmony with the international legal system.72 It suggests
focusing on the extent to which IO members have accepted a treaty: if a treaty is
accepted by a large number of IO members and potentially open to accession by all
states, it expresses a ‘common understanding’ on a specific area of law and therefore con-
stitutes relevant context.73
A counter-argument against this prevailing approach is that considering sources of
interpretation not accepted by all IO members could alter the content of the IO’s law
without the consent of the respective members and, therefore, conflict with the pacta
tertiis rule.74 Against this argument can be held that, despite judicial activism, the
interpretation of a treaty must not result in extending treaty obligations, but may only
64e.g. WTO Panel Report, Biotech (n 62) para 7.70; Jennings and Watts (n 19) 1275; Marceau, ‘A Call for Coherence’ (n 62)
128; ILC, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 57) paras 37ff; Dörr (n 57) para 89.
65Holger Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO: The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines (OUP 2007) 221; Dörr (n 57)
para 99.
66Villiger (n 61), art 31, para 25.
67Marceau, ‘A Call for Coherence’ (n 62) 123.
68See n 6 above.
69e.g. Marceau, ‘A Call for Coherence’ (n 62) 124ff; Pauwelyn (n 56) 575ff; Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement’ (n 56) 780ff;
Hestermeyer (n 65) 221ff.
70Marceau, ‘A Call for Coherence’ (n 62) 124; ILC, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 57) paras 450, 471; Hestermeyer (n 65) 222; Robert
Howse and Henrik Horn, ‘European Communities: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products’
(2009) 8 WTR 49, 56; Dörr (n 57) para 100.
71Marceau, ‘A Call for Coherence’ (n 62) 124ff; ILC, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 57) para 472.
72See references above in n 64.
73Marceau, ‘A Call for Coherence’ (n 62) 129ff; Pauwelyn, (n 56) 575ff; Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement’ (n 56) 781ff; ILC,
‘Fragmentation’ (n 57) para 472.
74See also text above accompanying n 46ff.
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clarify its scope,75 thus the pacta tertiis rule is not affected. Moreover, case-law resorting to
article 31(3)(c) shows that, although courts usually rely on rules of general international
law as relevant context, they also consider international treaties under that provision.76
Frequently, the treaty provisions taken into account also reflect customary international
law binding for all IO members. If treaty provisions do not reflect general international
law, courts, remarkably, rarely explore whether all parties to the dispute have accepted
the treaty,77 but rather examine the systemic function of that treaty provision in the inter-
national legal order.78 This practice reaffirms the purpose of article 31(3)(c) to facilitate
the harmonious interpretation of international law rather than establishing ‘ … the
triumph of one norm over the other’.79 A look at the formation of customary international
law supports that the wide acceptance of a treaty is sufficient to be considered as context
under article 31(3)(c): the formation of customary international law does not require
uniform acceptance but only ‘general’ and ‘increasing and widespread’ acceptance of a
rule;80 if general acceptance is enough to create legal obligations under customary inter-
national law, it will even more suffice to qualify a treaty rule as a source of interpretation
that does not alter but only clarify IO law.
As a result, it can be stated that the prevailing wide interpretation of article 31(3)(c) of
the VCLT enables IOs to consider the UN Covenants as relevant context when interpret-
ing IO law. The UN Covenants are widely accepted not only in the UN and the WTO, but
also in most other universal IOs.81 To the extent their provisions are generally accepted as
customary international law,82 they even come under the narrow interpretation of article
31(3)(c).83 All other provisions and related practice84 express at least the common under-
standing of the international community on the content of international human rights
obligations. For instance, the common understanding that the right to health also com-
prises obligations to reduce smoking85 may be relevant context, irrespective of its legal
quality, for interpreting the phrase ‘measures necessary to protect human […] health’
in article XX(b) GATT. Consequently, article 31(3)(c) enables IOs to interpret IO law
taking into account the UN Covenants without creating a pacta tertiis problem or under-
mining the independent legal personality of IOs.
A drawback of this treaty law approach is, however, that it is controversial as to what
extent article 31 of the VCLT provides a legal obligation to resort to the UN Covenants.
The prevailing view of legal scholars is that the rules of treaty interpretation constitute a
technique of treaty interpretation by suggesting elements to be considered when
75WTO Appellate Body Report on ‘India: Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products (US)’, WT/
DS50, adopted 16 January 1998, paras 46ff; Jennings and Watts (n 19) 1271f; Pauwelyn (n 56) 564.
76For relevant case-law: ILC, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 57) paras 434ff.
77An exception is WTO Panel Report, Biotech (n 62), paras 7.68ff, but in this case, the Panel found other ways to mitigate
this restrictive interpretation, see para 7.72; ILC, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 57) para 450; Dörr (n 57) para 102.
78Marceau, ‘A Call for Coherence’ (n 62) 126ff; ILC, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 57) para 473.
79ICJ, Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DR Congo v Belgium), Judgment (14 February 2000) 2000 ICJ
Reports 3, Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal, para 79; ILC, ‘Fragmentation’ (n 57)
para 474.
80Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles (n 18) 24ff.
81ICCPR: 169 parties, 6 signatories; ICESCR: 165 parties, 5 signatories, as of 15 August 2017: <http://indicators.ohchr.org/>
accessed 24 August 2017.
82The scope of substantive rights constituting customary international law is controversial and must be determined on a
case-by-case basis, see Kälin and Künzli (n 11) 68ff.
83See text accompanying n 70 above.
84See n 13 above.
85See n 6 above.
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interpreting a treaty in good faith, but the use of these elements is discretionary rather than
obligatory.86 Consequently, a treaty interpreter is free to choose from the appropriate
methods of interpretation listed in article 31 of the VCLT, and IOs will not be in
breach of their obligations under international treaty law if they interpret IO law in
good faith without taking into account the UN Covenants unless there is a clearly
abusive interpretation that amounts to an abuse of rights.87 Consequently, the rules of
treaty interpretation enable but do not oblige IOs to take into account the UN Covenants
when interpreting IO law.
5. Obligations of Cooperation between IOs and their Members
An obligation to take the UN Covenants into account when interpreting IO law could
provide the third approach: IOs could be bound by obligations to cooperate with their
members on human rights. Admittedly, the content and legal status of an obligation to
cooperate under general international law is controversial.88 Lacking a definition in inter-
national instruments, it can be best described as ‘interaction of entities aimed at achieving
a common end’.89 Although the obligation to cooperate is frequently considered to be a
moral rather than a legal obligation,90 it becomes legally binding if codified in treaty
law.91 For IOs, a legal obligation to cooperate with their members on human rights could
be enshrined in their statutes. Alternatively, obligations of cooperation codified in inter-
national human rights law could apply to IOs if they reflect general international law.
Both legal sources are binding for IOs92 and, therefore, could avoid the pacta tertiis problem.
The EU is a notable example of an IO whose founding treaties contain obligations of
cooperation. Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)93 establishes a
general mutual obligation of sincere or loyal cooperation between the EU and its
members.94 The purpose of this obligation is to facilitate the uniform application of the
EU legal order which is particularly relevant in the field of shared powers where both
EU conduct as well as the members’ conduct is needed to effectively implement the
Union’s law.95 The obligation of loyal cooperation requires the EU to take necessary
measures to reconcile EU interests and the members’ interests.96 These measures are,
86e.g. Jennings and Watts (n 19) 1270; Dörr (n 57) para 2.
87Cheng (n 60) 117, 212ff.
88e.g. Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘International Law of Cooperation’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP,
last updated April 2010) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL> accessed 24 August 2017; Jost Delbrück, ‘The International
Obligation to Cooperate: An Empty Shell or a Hard Law Principle of International Law?’ in Holger Hestermeyer and others
(eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 3.
89Tobias Stoll, ‘Article 56’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP
2012) 1603, para 11.
90Wolfrum (n 88) para 16.
91Delbrück (n 88) 6ff.
92See n 21 above.
93Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version 2012) (1 February 1992) [2012] OJ 2012 C326/13.
94Generally see John Temple Lang, ‘Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty’ (1990) 27 CMLR 645, 645ff; Kamiel
Mortelmans, ‘The Principle of Loyalty to the Community (Article 5 EC) and the Obligations of the Community Institutions’
(1998) 5 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 67, 67ff; Christophe Hillion, ‘Mixity and Coherence in EU
External Relations: The Significance of the “Duty of Cooperation”’ in Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos (eds), Mixed
Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World (Hart Publishing 2010) 87, 88ff; Marcus Klamert, The Prin-
ciple of Loyalty in EU Law (OUP 2014) 11ff.
95Mortelmans (n 94) 72.
96e.g. ECJ, Case C-2/88 Imm. JJ Zwartveld and Others, Order of the Court [1990] ECR I-3367, para 17; ECJ, Case C-339/00
Ireland v Commission [2003] ECR I-11782, para 71.
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however, limited to procedural obligations such as information sharing and consul-
tation.97 Consequently, the obligation of loyal cooperation is merely procedural in
nature: the EU must consider the members’ interests in good faith but there is no guaran-
tee that the members’ interests prevail.98
Article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)99 specifies
obligations of cooperation in case pre-accession international treaty obligations of EU
members conflict with EU law. Article 351(1) further provides that such treaties of EU
members at first are not affected by EU law, thus enabling EU members to fulfil their
pre-existing treaty obligations towards third states,100 with the aim to protect third-
party rights.101 To ensure uniform application of the Union’s law in the long run,
article 351(2) establishes obligations of cooperation: EU members must take appropriate
steps to eliminate incompatibilities between their international agreements and EU law;102
meanwhile, article 351(2) obliges the EU not to impede the performance of its members’
treaty obligations. Following consistent CJEU jurisprudence, this obligation merely
requires the EU to consider its members’ treaty obligations in good faith, but it does
not bind the EU to observe its members’ treaty obligations, let alone create an obligation
of the EU towards third states.103 Accordingly, as in article 4(3) of the TEU, the scope of
the EU’s obligation to cooperate in article 351 of the TFEU is only procedural in nature.
With respect to fundamental rights, however, the CJEU introduces in Kadi a substan-
tive element into the obligations of cooperation: article 351 of the TFEU may ‘ … in no
circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that form part of the very foun-
dations of the Community legal order, one of which is the protection of fundamental
rights… ’104 This interpretation suggests that fundamental rights play a special role for
the obligation of loyal cooperation: whereas article 351 generally requires the EU to con-
sider the EU members’ treaty obligations in conflict with EU law in good faith, such con-
sideration is not permitted if the members’ treaty obligations require an interference with
fundamental rights. Accordingly, the EU’s obligation to cooperate includes not only pro-
cedural obligations but also a substantive element, namely the obligation to respect funda-
mental rights.
Although this specification of the obligation to cooperate is based on fundamental
rights as part of ‘the very foundations of the Community legal order’, a look at the
origins of the EU’s fundamental rights obligations reveals that the members’ human
rights treaty obligations have played an essential role. When Kadi was decided, namely
before the Treaty of Lisbon inserted the binding Charter of Fundamental Rights
(CFR),105 the EU respected fundamental rights as ‘general principles of the Union’s
97Temple Lang (n 94) 647ff; Mortelmans (n 94) 79ff; Hillion (n 94) 97ff.
98Mortelmans (n 94) 72; Hillion (n 94) 103ff.
99Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version 2012) (15 March 1957) [2012] OJ C326/47.
100ECJ, Case 812/79 Attorney General v Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, para 8; ECJ, Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria [2009] ECR
I-1301, para 33.
101Jan Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (OUP 2009) 137f.
102ECJ, Commission v Austria (n 100) paras 34, 44.
103ECJ, Burgoa (n 100) para 9; CJEU, Air Transport Association (n 44) para 61; see also Ahmed and De Jesús (n 24) 788; De
Schutter (n 24) 60ff; Naert (n 24) 135ff.
104ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para 304;
Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘Revisiting Article 307 EC: The Untouchable Core of Fundamental European Constitutional Law Values
and Principles’ in Filippo Fontanelli and others (eds), Shaping the Rule of Law through Dialogue: International and Supra-
national Experiences (Europa Law 2010) 119.
105TEU art 6(1).
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law’106 deduced from ‘ … guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signa-
tories’.107 The predominant authority was played the ECHR,108 but the CJEU also resorted
to the ICCPR and other human rights treaties as a ‘source of inspiration’.109 As the CJEU
interpreted the obligation of loyal cooperation in Kadi as including an obligation not to
challenge fundamental rights, as deduced from the members’ human rights treaty obli-
gations, it essentially recognised an indirect obligation to respect the EU members’
human rights treaty obligations. This obligation, however, is a mere internal obligation
between the EU and its members but does not create a legal bond between the EU and
the UN Covenants or other human rights treaties.110 Thus, it preserves the independent
legal personality of the EU and its right to consent to treaty obligations.
In contrast to the EU, founding treaties of other IOs, like the UN or the WTO, do not
specify any obligations of cooperation regarding their members’ treaty obligations.
Although article 103 of the UN Charter addresses treaty obligations of UN members, it
is a mere conflict clause providing that UN Charter obligations prevail over other treaty
obligations of UN members111 and does not lay down obligations of the UN to observe
its members’ treaty obligations. Similarly, the WTOAgreements do not specify obligations
of cooperation, but only reaffirm the general obligation of IOs to interpret their statutes in
accordance with the customary rules of treaty interpretation.112 Hence, lacking specific
provisions on cooperation as enshrined in the EU treaties, IOs must apply and interpret
their founding treaties in good faith but an obligation to respect their members’ human
rights treaty obligations does not exist.113
Another possible source of an IO’s obligation to observe its members’ human rights
treaty obligations could be obligations of cooperation stemming from international
human rights law if and to the extent that they reflect general international law. Following
articles 1(3), 55(c) and 56 of the UN Charter, UN members are not only obliged to take
joint and separate action, but also to cooperate with the UN to promote, respect and
protect human rights.114 One result of this cooperation has been the creation of the UN
human rights machinery, including the UN Covenants.115 The ICESCR further specifies
these obligations of cooperation enshrined in article 56 of the UN Charter.116 Article 2
(1) of the ICESCR requires states to ‘undertake to take steps, individually and through
international assistance and cooperation’ to realise the rights recognised in the ICESCR.
106TEU art 6(2) before Lisbon, now TEU art 6(3).
107e.g. ECJ, Case C-112/00 Schmidberger v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659, paras 71, 79ff.
108TEU art 6(3).
109e.g. ECJ, Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283, para 31; ECJ, Case C-249/96 Grant v South-West Trains [1998]
ECR I-621, para 44; ECJ, Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769, para 37; ECJ, Case C-244/06 Dynamic
Medien v Avides Media [2008] ECR I-505, para 39.
110Naert (n 24) and references there at n 72.
111Andreas Paulus and Johann Ruben Leiss, ‘Article 103’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds), The Charter of the United Nations:
A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 2110, paras 29ff.
112art 3.2 DSU; see also text above accompanying n57ff.
113See text above accompanying n 81ff.
114Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Intersentia 2003) 370ff; Sigrun Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International
Cooperation (Intersentia 2006) 74ff; Eibe Riedel and Jan-Michael Arend, ‘Article 55 (c)’ in Bruno Simma and others (eds),
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1565, para 15; Stoll (n 89) paras 5ff, 11ff.
115See <www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UniversalHumanRightsInstruments.aspx> accessed 24 August
2017.
116e.g. ICESCR GC No 14 (Right to Health) (n 6) paras 38ff; ICESCR GC No 15 (Right to Water) (n 12) paras 30ff.
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Further, its articles 22 and 23 suggest measures of cooperation including the negotiation
and conclusion of agreements, the adoption of recommendations, bringing situations to
the attention of relevant UN organs and agencies, or international assistance and train-
ing.117 Other non-binding instruments extend these obligations of cooperation to all
human rights.118 The predominant view is that all these sources only establish obligations
of cooperation that are limited to good faith procedural cooperation on human rights, but
they do not permit to deduce obligations to observe substantive human rights.119
Conversely, more recent General Comments to the ICESCR suggest a wider interpret-
ation of the obligation to cooperate that includes substantive human rights obligations:
they deduce from articles 2(1) and 23 ‘international obligations’ that require states to
observe human rights in other states.120 This extended interpretation of the ICESCR’s
implementing obligations parallels the gradual extension of the territorial scope of appli-
cation in the practice of both Covenants.121 If it can be shown that these extended human
rights obligations include an obligation to observe human rights in other states, and if such
a rule is generally accepted, it may apply mutatis mutandis to IOs and oblige them to
observe their members’ human rights obligations. To determine the existence of such a
rule, the legal nature, content, and scope of application of human rights obligations will
be examined in the light of the practice of the UN Covenants.122
The UN Covenants establish general implementing obligations that determine how
states must give effect to substantive human rights. Articles 2 of both Covenants oblige
states to respect, ensure and protect the substantive rights recognised in each Covenant.
The obligation to respect is a negative obligation that requires states not to interfere
with human rights, whereas the obligations to protect and to ensure require positive
implementing measures.123 These obligations constitute generally accepted standards of
implementing human rights and are accessory to all substantive human rights.124
As the human rights obligations enshrined in the UN Covenants are owed to individ-
uals, they seem at first sight not to be relevant for IOs who primarily create obligations for
states but rarely address individuals directly. However, the implementation of human
rights also constitutes an obligation between states.125 The obligation to cooperate to
promote human rights, which is part of the general implementing obligations, constitutes
117Sepúlveda (n 114) 370ff.
118e.g. UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (FRD) (24 October 1970) UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), prin-
ciple 4, para b; UN World Conference on Human Rights, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (25 June 1993) A/
CONF157/23, preamble and I.4.
119For the UN Charter: Frédéric Mégret and Florian Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 25 HRQ 314, 319ff; Janik (n 20) 334; Riedel and Arend (n
114) para 15; for the ICESCR: Sepúlveda (n 114) 370ff.
120e.g. ICESCR GC No 14 (Right to Health) (n 6) paras 38ff; ICESCR GC No 15 (Right to Water) (n 12) paras 30ff; ICESCR General
Comment No 18: The Right to Work (art 6 of the Covenant) (24 November 2005) E/C12/GC/18, paras 29ff; ICESCR General
Comment No 19: The Right to Social Security (art 9 of the Covenant) (4 February 2008) E/C12/GC/19, paras 52ff; Skogly (n
114) 66ff; Stoll (n 89) paras 19ff.
121Generally Fons Coomans (ed), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004); Kälin and Künzli (n
11) 77ff, 129ff.
122An examination of all human rights instruments is not possible in the framework of this article.
123Generally ICESCR GC No 3 (Nature of States Parties’ Obligations) (n 126); HRC General Comment No 31: The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant (28 March 2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13); Sepúl-
veda (n 114) 157ff, 196ff; Kälin and Künzli (n 11) 96ff, 113ff.
124Sepúlveda (n 114) 115ff; Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, NP Engel
2005), art 2, paras 3, 15ff; Kälin and Künzli (n 11) 96ff.
125Kälin and Künzli (n 11) 94f.
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a ‘classical’ international law obligation between states.126 But also, all other human rights
implementing obligations are not only owed to individuals but to states as well.127 As obli-
gations between subjects of international law these obligations are also relevant for IOs.
To what extent human rights obligations must be implemented is determined by the
scope of application of the Covenants. Generally, human rights obligations are territorial,
namely they are owed to individuals on a state’s territory;128 but human rights obligations
also extend extraterritorially to persons under a state’s jurisdiction.129 The relevant cri-
terion is that a state exercises control over foreign territory or individuals on foreign ter-
ritory.130 Consequently, human rights implementing obligations extend to all acts of states
that possibly affect human rights within or outside a state’s territory.131
The limit of a state’s human rights implementing obligations is the sovereign authority
of other states; hence, the obligations to implement human rights cease if their fulfilment
requires measures that interfere with the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of other
states.132 Consequently, human rights implementing obligations of states owed outside
their territory are necessarily limited to negative human rights implementing obligations,
namely the obligation not to interfere with human rights in other states. If a state were
obliged to adopt positive measures to implement human rights in other states, the fulfil-
ment of such obligation would, lacking consent of the state concerned, require the viola-
tion of the sovereign rights of other states and disregard the principles of sovereign
equality and non-intervention.133 This limit is expressly stressed in some of the General
Comments establishing international obligations.134 It also reflects the scope of the obli-
gation to cooperate under general international law which is limited to procedural
steps, but does neither require nor permit to interfere with sovereign rights of third
states.135 Similarly, the CJEU’s interpretation of the obligations to cooperate in article
351 of the TFEU limits them to non-interference with human rights.136 As a result, it is
suggested that the obligation not to interfere with the implementation of human rights
in other states constitutes the generally accepted scope of application of human rights obli-
gations. As generally accepted obligation between subjects of international law, it also
applies to IOs and requires them to respect the human rights obligations of their members.
The final – and most controversial – question concerns the substantive scope of human
rights obligations that must be respected. As the UN Covenants constitute pacta tertiis for
IOs and IO members who are not parties to them, the substantive obligations enshrined in
the Covenants are not binding for IOs. However, the Covenants and their practice play a
126ICESCR art 2(1); ICESCR General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (art 2, para 1, of the Covenant)
(14 December 1990) E/1991/23, paras 13, 14.
127ICJ, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment (Second Phase) (5 February
1970) 1970 ICJ Reports 3, paras 33f; HRC GC No 31 (General Legal Obligations) (n 123) para 2; see also n 12 above.
128Kälin and Künzli (n 11) 129f.
129ICCPR art 2(1); HRC GC No 31 (General Legal Obligations) (n 123) para 10; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (9 July 2004) 2004 ICJ Reports 136, paras 107ff; Fons Coomans,
‘Application of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Framework of International
Organizations’ (2007) 11 MPYUNL 359, 362; Kälin and Künzli (n11) 132f.
130e.g. ICJ, Legal Consequences (n 129) paras 107ff; Coomans, Extraterritorial Application (n 121) 41ff.
131HRC GC No 31 (General Legal Obligations) (n 123) para 4.
132Nowak (n 124) art 2, para 27.
133UN Charter arts 2 (1) and (4); UN General Assembly, FRD (n 118) principles 3 and 4, para c; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles
(n 18) 448ff.
134e.g. ICESCR GC No 14 (Right to Health) (n 6) para 39.
135See text above accompanying n 114ff.
136See text above accompanying n 104ff; Ahmed and De Jesús (n 24) 794f.
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major role in defining generally accepted core obligations of substantive human rights that
cannot be reserved, derogated from or otherwise limited.137 Subject to a case-by-case
determination, these substantive obligations bind IOs and all their members as customary
international law.138 Beyond this standard, IOs are not bound to respect their members’
obligations under the Covenants.
To conclude, although the legal obligations of international cooperation generally are
limited to procedural obligations, there is an emerging consensus that the obligation to
cooperate in international human rights law also comprises limited substantive obli-
gations, namely the obligation not to interfere with the human rights obligations of
other subjects of international law. Under general international law, this obligation is,
however, limited to substantive human rights that form part of customary international
law, the extension to the UN Covenants would create a pacta tertiis problem. Being
part of general international law, this obligation requires IOs not to interfere with their
members’ human rights obligations under customary international law and to interpret
their statutes accordingly.139 An obligation to interpret the statutes taking into account
the UN Covenants, however, cannot be inferred from the obligation to cooperate.
6. Conclusion
The accountability gap that prevents holding IOs responsible for activities in breach of
international human rights law does not only undermine the acceptance of IOs as a
forum of international cooperation, but also severely weakens the achievements of the
UN Covenants. However, obliging IOs to observe their members’ obligations under the
Covenants is not an easy endeavour. The challenge for all approaches discussed in this
article is to pay deference to the separate legal personality of IOs, which is essential for
the fulfilment of its functions and to international treaty law which requires consent to
be bound by treaties. Without consent, the Covenants constitute pacta tertiis for IOs
and for IO members who are not parties to the Covenants.
Establishing a direct obligation of IOs to observe the UN Covenants proves difficult.
The theories of succession or substitution assume that the accession of states to IOs trig-
gers an ‘automatic’ transfer of the states’ treaty obligations to IOs. But in practice the trans-
fer of treaty obligations always takes place only after consent of all relevant actors. An
‘automatic’ transfer of the members’ obligations under the UN Covenants to IOs
without their express consent would not only disregard the fundamentals of international
treaty law, but also weaken the separate legal personality of IOs by depriving them of an
essential component of that personality.
The other two approaches discussed in this article allow at least an indirect legal effect
of the UN Covenants on IOs. The rules of treaty interpretation provide for the interpret-
ation of IO law in harmony with the international legal order. These rules enable IOs to
take into account the Covenants as relevant context when interpreting their statutes as the
Covenants represent a common understanding on human rights obligations. As the
interpretation of IO law does not alter but only clarify its content, the pacta tertiis rule
137On possibilities to limit substantive human rights obligations Nowak (n 124) arts 4 and 5; Sepúlveda (n 114) 277ff; Kälin
and Künzli (n 11) 125ff.
138See n 82 above; Sepúlveda (n 114) 365ff.
139See text above accompanying n 86f.
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is not affected. It is, however, controversial whether the rules of treaty interpretation estab-
lish a legal obligation to resort to the Covenants as relevant context, as they give broad
discretion to the interpreter to decide on the methods of treaty interpretation applied as
long as a treaty is interpreted in good faith.
A limited legal obligation of IOs to observe the Covenants suggests the third approach,
which is based on obligations of international cooperation. Although the obligation to
cooperate under general international law, as well as under human rights law, is limited
to procedural obligations, there is emerging generally accepted practice that suggests
that human rights obligations enshrine international obligations to respect human
rights obligations of other subjects of international law. Being part of general international
law, these obligations require IOs not to interfere with their members’ human rights obli-
gations when performing their conduct. In the light of this obligation, IOs must take into
account their members’ human rights obligations when interpreting IO law. However, this
obligation only extends to the human rights obligations of the Covenants that reflect cus-
tomary international law. Beyond this level, IOs have no obligation, but at least the possi-
bility to take the Covenant’s obligations into account to facilitate the interpretation of IO
law in harmony with the international legal order.
The UN Covenants play a crucial role for determining the substantive human rights
standards of relevance for IOs. Although usually not all members of an IO are bound
by the UN Covenants, the extensive practice of their Committees provides the basis for
identifying minimum core obligations of substantive human rights that cannot be dero-
gated from or otherwise limited.140 Due to the large number of states parties from all
legal traditions, these elements of substantive human rights can be considered to be
accepted beyond the parties to the Covenants as customary international law. All other
elements constitute at least a common understanding of the international community
on the content and scope of international human rights obligations.
An important contribution to promote the influence of the Covenants on IOs is to
increasingly identify generally accepted elements of substantive human rights obligations
that are of special relevance for the conduct of IOs. Thereby, the role of the Committees is
vital. Some General Comments already address the obligations of states in IOs as well as of
non-state actors, including IOs, albeit in a very general manner.141 To strengthen the
impact of the Covenants on the conduct of IOs, however, it is necessary that the Commit-
tees determine expressly and in detail those aspects of substantive human rights obli-
gations that are affected by IO conduct, namely where IO members’ obligations arising
from their membership in IOs are likely to conflict with their human rights obligations.
Identifying the members’ human rights obligations when acting in IOs will help clarifying
the corresponding obligations of IOs, and thus, not only raise the awareness of IOs for
conceivable conflicts between their conduct and substantive human rights, but also
further improve the implementation of the UN Covenants.
140See n 13 and n 137f above.
141e.g. ICESCR GC No 15 (Right to Water) (n 12) paras 30ff, 60; ICESCR GC No 19 (Right to Social Security) (n 120) paras 52ff,
82ff.
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